

# **PEEL: Police effectiveness 2017**

# A inspection of Greater Manchester Police



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## Force in numbers



# Calls for assistance

Incidents per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2017 Greater Manchester Police England and Wales

281
282



## Anti-social behaviour

Anti-social behaviour (ASB) incidents per 1,000 population 12 months to 31 March 2017

Change in ASB incidents 12 months to 31 March 2016 against 12 months to 31 March 2017






## Crime (excluding fraud)

Crimes recorded per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2017

Change in recorded crime 12 months to 30 June 2016 against 12 months to 30 June 2017





Charged/summonsed

Evidential difficulties: suspect identified but victim does not support action

Investigation completed but no suspect identified

10%
nd and Wales
13%
nd and Wales



## Domestic abuse

Domestic abuse incidents per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2017

Domestic abuse as a percentage of all recorded crime (excluding fraud) 12 months to 30 June 2017

Greater Manchester Police	England and Wales	
18	15	
Greater Manchester Police	England and Wales	
9%	11%	



# Organised crime groups

Organised crime groups per 1 million population as at 1 July 2017

Greater Manchester Police England and Wales

46
47

<sup>\*</sup>Figures are shown as proportions of outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017. For further information about the data in this graphic please see annex A.

## **Risk-based inspection**

HMICFRS adopted an interim risk-based approach to inspection in 2017 in order to focus more closely on areas of policing where risk to the public is most acute. Under this approach, not all forces are assessed against every part of the PEEL effectiveness programme every year. Greater Manchester Police was assessed against the following areas in 2017:

- Investigating crime and reducing re-offending;
- Protecting vulnerable people; and
- Specialist capabilities.

Judgments from 2016<sup>2</sup> remain in place for areas which were not re-inspected in 2017. HMICFRS will continue to monitor areas for improvement identified in previous inspections and will assess how well each force has responded in future reports.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> More details of the interim risk-based approach are on the HMICFRS website: <u>www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/peel-assessments/how-we-inspect/2017-peel-assessment/#risk-based</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The 2016 effectiveness report for Greater Manchester Police is on the HMICFRS website: <u>www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/publications/peel-police-effectiveness-2016-greater-manchester</u>

### **Effectiveness overview**

## **Judgments**

**Overall effectiveness 2017** 



Question	Grade	Last inspected
Preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour	Good	2016
Investigating crime and reducing re- offending	Requires improvement	2017
Protecting vulnerable people	Requires improvement	2017
Tackling serious and organised crime	Outstanding	2016
Specialist capabilities	Ungraded	2017

## **Summary**

Greater Manchester Police requires improvement at keeping people safe and reducing crime. Although the force has made progress in some areas since 2016, its approach to protecting vulnerable people has deteriorated. This is the main reason for our overall judgment moving from good to requires improvement.

Demand on resources is high with a significant increase in crime recording since the last inspection. Further action is therefore needed to ensure timely attendance, safeguarding of victims and evidence recovery at incidents involving vulnerable people. As such Greater Manchester Police needs to improve the way it investigates crime and how it protects those victims who are vulnerable.

The force has effective processes in place to assess the risk within incidents and crimes at initial contact in its control room. These identify those people who are vulnerable or have been repeat victims of crime and domestic abuse. However, once the level of risk and appropriate graded response has been decided, the force has difficulty at times in allocating resources to attend those calls and meet that demand. This has an adverse impact on the initial investigation of crime, obtaining evidence at the scene, the potential for arresting offenders and safeguarding victims of crime. This means that victims are not always receiving the best service from the police and is a cause of concern for HMICFRS. Once officers are in attendance at incidents and crimes, the service to the public and safeguarding of victims improves.

The force also needs to improve the quality of its investigations, particularly for non- complex offences, increasing the active supervision of investigations and ensuring that appropriate lines of enquiry and evidential opportunities are taken to improve the outcomes of those investigations for victims of crime. The quality of investigations into serious or complex offences is better, with appropriate oversight and victim care. The force has effective processes to apprehend offenders and manage those who are most at risk of re-offending.

The force has effective partnership working with other organisations, such as local authorities or mental health services. As a result of this, it is able to maintain continuing support and longer-term safeguarding for the people who have been identified as most vulnerable.

Greater Manchester Police has the necessary arrangements in place to fulfil its national responsibilities, and to respond to an attack requiring an armed response.

## Investigating crime and reducing re-offending



Requires improvement

## **Initial investigation**

Greater Manchester Police is inconsistent in how it carries out initial investigations and routinely does not attend incidents within suitable timescales. The force has processes in place to assess the risk associated with the incidents that are reported through its call-handling facility. The force uses a variation of the national risk-assessment process known as THRIVE.3 This variation is called STRIVE, with the S representing the safeguarding element of the risk assessment. The force ICT systems support the assessment of risk through the person's location or telephone number contact history, and can recognise previously identified vulnerable and repeat victims. However, the force regularly has high numbers of incidents which it does not attend within a suitable time; this affects the initial investigation and, as mentioned in the section below, how the force provides the appropriate response to those assessed as vulnerable. During our inspection, we found that once officers arrive at the scene, they generally complete initial investigations to a satisfactory standard. We also found that when investigations are handed over from neighbourhood officers to more specialist investigators, the quality of the handover is good, with occasional shortcomings. However, the force's ability to match neighbourhood officers to the public demand for its services is a cause of concern.

Since HMICFRS' 2016 effectiveness report, the force has introduced crime progression teams (CPTs) across all divisions. These teams are responsible for monitoring crime recording, screening<sup>4</sup> and the crime allocation process within each of the force districts. Part of the role of the teams is to conduct telephone investigations for incidents and crimes which can be resolved suitably without deploying an officer to the scene. We found that the force has an inconsistent method of conducting telephone investigations within the CPTs, and the quality of response varies. The CPTs are focused on recording and classifying crimes and deciding if crimes are to be investigated further, or filed if there are no lines of enquiry for investigation; this limits the time and opportunity to conduct telephone

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The threat, harm, risk, investigation, vulnerability and engagement (THRIVE) model is used to assess the appropriate initial police response to a call for service. It allows a judgment to be made of the relative risk posed by the call and places the individual needs of the victim at the centre of that decision.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Crime screening is a method of assessing the crime and the likelihood of identifying the perpetrator of that crime. The decision to screen out a crime is primarily based on the availability of investigative opportunities and the victim's wishes.

investigations. The force conducts fewer telephone investigations than the England and Wales rate. The force may wish to reassure itself that it is making the best use of incident and crime resolution without deployment to reduce the demand on its neighbourhood teams.

The figures received from Greater Manchester Police suggest it receives the second highest number of fraud referrals in England and Wales from the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB). At present, after a triage assessment and screening for any crimes which require recording, the force investigates 4 percent of the investigation referrals it receives. The force has undertaken a peer review of its fraud provision and reviewed its ability to respond to the volume of fraud. It has introduced an assessment triage process to review the fraud referrals it receives and ensure that the most vulnerable victims receive appropriate victim care, while making the best use of its fraud investigators. The force is also trying to identify those people who are most at risk of fraud and provide them with crime prevention support to reduce the risk of them becoming victims.

The force has a policy for the allocation and investigation of crime, based on risk assessment. This identifies vulnerability and risk, and allocation takes account of the skills and experience of its investigators. During the inspection, we were pleased to find that the force allocates the vast majority of investigations to appropriately skilled officers and staff. Those we spoke to had achievable investigative workloads.

## Investigation quality

We found the quality of investigations to be inconsistent. Greater Manchester Police, like a number of forces nationally, has not been able to recruit sufficient officers into the role of a Professionalising Investigation Programme level 2 qualified detective (trained to conduct serious and complex investigations). This has resulted in too many vacant detective posts. The force has re-aligned its specialist detectives to provide districts with more qualified officers, and has increased its selection and training capacity to meet this gap. The force has enough planned professional development training days for its investigators to refresh and develop their skills.

Before our inspection, we reviewed 90 crime investigation files. In addition, a small number of investigations were examined in more detail during the inspection. The force allocates its less serious or complex investigations to neighbourhood officers. More serious or specialised investigations, such as high-risk domestic abuse and serious sexual offences, are allocated to detectives either within the public protection investigation unit (PPIU) or the criminal investigation department (CID).

We found that investigations for lower-level offences are of an inconsistent quality. For example, we identified that some investigations lacked investigation plans and effective supervision, evidential opportunities were missed, and there were delays in conducting lines of enquiry. Of investigations into crimes recorded by Greater

Manchester Police in the 12 months to 30 June 2017, 59 percent failed to identify a suspect. This compares with the England and Wales rate of 48 percent. We found that neighbourhood officers are regularly directed towards calls for service when they should be working on an investigation. The force is aware of this problem and for some time has been conducting monthly peer review audits of 100 crime investigations to assess the quality of the investigation supervision and victim care. Training and support have been provided to both the investigators and frontline supervisors to improve the quality of the investigations. The standard is improving but the force acknowledges that more needs to be done, particularly in relation to the supervision of investigations.

Our inspection found that more serious and specialist investigations were of a better quality, with appropriate investigation plans, good supervision and recorded victim care. Our review of criminal investigation files identified that the force had conducted an effective investigation in 68 out of the 90 crime files reviewed. The force was found to provide updates to victims of crime in the majority of cases, maintaining regular and appropriate updates. The force records the updates within the crime investigation files. The crime file review identified that there had been good victim care in 73 of the 90 case files reviewed.

The force provides its investigators with appropriate support functions, such as intelligence analysis and research within districts, crime scene investigator assessment and attendance, and the examination of digital media devices. We found that investigators knew how to access the support from their intelligence hubs, such as open source intelligence research and analysis. We were pleased to find that the force has improved its capacity to examine digital media devices, reducing the backlogs and times for examination and providing a triage capability to examine computers at crime scenes. The force has approved further investment in capacity and capability within the unit to improve its digital media provision over the next 18 months, which includes funding for an additional 42 staff within the unit.




Figure 1: Proportion of investigations where action was taken, by force, for offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017<sup>5,6</sup>

Source: 2016 and 2017 Home Office Outcomes Data For further information about this data, please see annex A

Greater Manchester Police does not always achieve effective outcomes for the crimes it investigates. With an increase in recorded crime, there may be a corresponding increase in the number of offences without a suspect or reasonable lines of enquiry. This may have an appreciable effect on outcomes for crimes recorded. In the 12 months to 30 June 2017, the suspect was identified in 32.7 percent of investigations; this compares with the England and Wales rate of 39.4 percent. The force only took action against an offender in 11.4 percent of crimes, compared with 15.6 percent in England and Wales. The force has a charge or summons rate of 7.2 percent, compared to the England and Wales rate of 10.2 percent.

<sup>5</sup> Investigations where action was taken includes the outcome categories of Charged/Summonsed, Taken into consideration and Out-of-court (formal and informal).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Suffolk Constabulary was unable to provide 2017 crime outcomes data. Dorset Police was unable to provide 2016 crime outcomes data. Therefore figures for England and Wales will differ from those published by the Home Office. For further information about this data, please see annex A.

The force believes that the lower proportion of suspect identified and action taken against an offender outcomes is as a result of increased crime recording and compliance with Home Office Counting Rules.<sup>7</sup> It is positive that the force has a lower rate of cases where the suspect has been identified, but there are evidential difficulties and the victim does not support police action. This occurred in 10.5 percent of cases compared with the England and Wales rate of 12.9 percent of cases.

## Reducing re-offending

Greater Manchester Police has effective processes in place to reduce re-offending and to manage offenders who pose a risk to the public. The officer investigating the case (OIC) prepares the evidence to support the case and attempts to arrest the offender. If the offender cannot be located, the OIC remains the person in charge of co-ordinating the arrest. The offender's details are then circulated on the Police National Computer (PNC) and colleagues continue to locate and arrest on behalf of the OIC. The examination of PNC data shows that in July 2017 the force had 46 percent of its overall number of wanted offenders wanted for between 0 to 3 months; this figure decreased to 11 percent for offenders wanted for between 3 to 6 months. This demonstrates the effort the force makes to arrest offenders.

The force checks on foreign national offenders through an automated referral system within its custody suites. Through this automated process, the force has increased the number of ACRO<sup>8</sup> referrals by 14.1 percent on the previous year, whereas the England and Wales rate for referrals has decreased by 5.6 percent. The force works in partnership with the Border Force to tackle the issue of foreign nationals offending in Greater Manchester. The force arrested 3,697 foreign national offenders in the 12 months to 30 June 2017 and, of these, 45 percent were referred to the Immigration Enforcement command and control unit for immigration checks to be made.

The force has a dedicated integrated offender management (IOM) team within each of its districts to manage those offenders who pose a risk of re-offending. It has reviewed and reduced the number of individuals in its IOM group or cohort and, as at 1 July 2017, this numbered 821 offenders. The cohort includes both violent and domestic abuse offenders. It consists only of men, as the force has a separate approach for managing female offenders through women's referral centres which provide diversion programmes, welfare and family support.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The Home Office Counting Rules provide a national standard for the recording and counting of 'notifiable' offences recorded by police forces in England and Wales (known as 'recorded crime').

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> ACRO Criminal Records Office manages criminal record information and improves the exchange of criminal records and biometric information.

The force has agreements with supermarkets and retail outlets, which refer offending women directly to this service rather than prosecute them. If the female offenders do not take up the offer and support, they are prosecuted. The force reviews and monitors these offenders and works with partner organisations to provide additional opportunities and pathways out of re-offending. These include programmes such as alcohol and substance misuse, anger management and other educational programmes. Currently, the force does not have suitable ICT to identify the re-offending rate of its IOM cohort, so reviewing its effectiveness is difficult. A new force ICT system is to be introduced in the spring of 2018 to provide the force with the data.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force should take steps to ensure that all available evidence is recorded at scenes of crime.
- The force should ensure that there is regular and active supervision of investigations to improve quality and progress.

## Protecting vulnerable people and supporting victims



Requires improvement

## Identifying vulnerability

Greater Manchester Police is effective in the way it identifies vulnerable people. The force has vulnerability as a main strategic priority, which its frontline officers and staff understand. It has a clear definition of vulnerability, and by providing its officers and staff with training, has raised awareness of the need to identify and safeguard vulnerable victims and others who are identified as vulnerable. The force has a good understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerability in the Greater Manchester area. It has analysed data, recording its assessment of different types of vulnerability to understand better where it needs to concentrate its support for those who are vulnerable. This helps the force understand the nature and scale of aspects of vulnerability such as modern slavery and domestic abuse.

The force uses a variation of the national risk assessment process known as THRIVE, called STRIVE, with the S representing the safeguarding element of the risk assessment (see above). During our inspection, we found that, in the main, frontline officers and staff understood vulnerability, how to identify it and their responsibilities to protect those who are vulnerable. However, we heard some frustrations from officers who felt they could be letting vulnerable people down by not attending incidents within appropriate timescales.

The force has effective processes in place to identify vulnerable and repeat victims consistently at the first point of contact within the force control room. Call handlers use call history, and match locations and phone numbers to identify repeat callers. There is also research into other ICT systems, which can support the risk assessment process and help call handlers decide the level of risk. Call handlers have pre-prepared question sets for types of incidents and crimes to support them in assessing the call. Supervisors and experienced police officers are on hand for advice and they quality assure the identification of risk and force response within the incident logs. Vulnerability referrals are generated from the force command and control system to record and refer incidents of vulnerability to the appropriate district

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Greater Manchester Police uses its own definition of a vulnerable victim: "A person may be vulnerable by reason of age and/or their circumstances. Or, who suffers from mental or physical disabilities, illness, or other such special feature, which renders them either permanently or temporarily unable to care or protect themselves against harm or exploitation."

multi-agency safeguarding hub (MASH).<sup>10</sup> Force ICT systems, such as its command and control system and its crime system, have markers or flags to identify victims of domestic abuse and those people who have been identified as vulnerable. This assists call handlers in the initial assessment of incidents.

## **Initial response**

Greater Manchester Police's initial response to vulnerable people requires improvement. The force has a graded response policy to support the deployment of its officers for the risk identified during the initial call, yet, during the inspection, we found that it has high numbers of incidents, including those with vulnerable people, that officers are unable to attend within the assessed and graded response time. The force monitors the risk within the unallocated incidents but is constantly struggling to match its available resources with its demand. The force routinely does not deploy officers to attend incidents within appropriate timescales and at times is not able to support vulnerable victims or gather evidence at crime scenes.

The force is aware of this problem and has plans in place to manage its demand better and improve its attendance times; the plans include a new shift system and increased use of resolution without deployment. A total of 38 vulnerable victims were identified during the review of 90 crime files; attendance was required for 33 of those victims, but the force attended appropriately on 17 occasions. This means the force only attended appropriately in half the crime files we examined. We assessed that the delay in attendance had an adverse effect on the victim or investigation in 15 of these cases. The force provides an inconsistent and sometimes poor initial response to victims who have been identified as vulnerable. This has a potential impact on the victim and the investigation, particularly in domestic abuse cases when the opportunity to take positive action against a perpetrator may well have passed by the time officers attend.

During HMICFRS' 2016 effectiveness inspection, we found that the force needed to ensure that neighbourhood officers become more proficient in completing risk assessments at initial response. We were pleased to find that, when officers had attended the scene, the quality of risk assessment, using the nationally-recognised domestic abuse, stalking and harassment (DASH)<sup>11</sup> format, had improved. We examined a number of both DASH and vulnerable adult risk assessments and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> A multi-agency safeguarding hub (MASH) is a location in which staff from the police, local authority and other safeguarding agencies share data, research and decision making about local children and adults who are vulnerable; the purpose is to ensure a timely and joined-up response for children and vulnerable adults who require protection.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> DASH is a risk identification, assessment and management model adopted by UK police forces and partner agencies in 2009. It helps frontline practitioners identify high-risk cases of domestic abuse, stalking, harassment and so-called honour-based violence.

found they were completed to a good standard, with supervisory oversight, secondary triage and effective partnership engagement to support vulnerable people and victims. However, the force does not currently undertake a domestic violence satisfaction survey to seek the views of domestic abuse victims, including those who do not wish to support a prosecution. The force should implement a process to obtain feedback from victims of domestic abuse. The force provides its frontline officers with body-worn video cameras (BWV) to enable them to record evidence and injuries at scenes, particularly in cases of domestic abuse. During the inspection, we found that officers were more aware of the evidence gathered using BWV and were making better use of it.

The rate of arrest for domestic abuse offences can provide an indication of a force's approach to handling domestic abuse offenders. Although for the purpose of this calculation arrests are not linked directly to offences, a high arrest rate may suggest that a force prioritises arrests for domestic abuse offenders over other potential forms of action (for further information, please see annex A). HMICFRS has evaluated the arrest rate alongside other measures during our inspection process to understand how each force deals with domestic abuse overall.




Figure 2: Domestic abuse arrest rate (per 100 domestic abuse-related offences), by force, in the 12 months to 30 June 2017<sup>12,13</sup>

Source: 2016 and 2017 HMICFRS data return, 2016 and 2017 Home Office domestic abuse crime data<sup>14</sup>

### For further information about this data, please see annex A

Greater Manchester Police's arrest rate for domestic abuse crimes has decreased by 32.7 percent in the 12 months to 30 June 2017 compared with the same period in the previous year. Although the decrease in arrest rate may be due to increased recording of domestic abuse-related offences, it should also be noted that there has been a decrease in the volume of arrests, from 11,932 in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, to 11,798 in the same period in 2017. The force should reassure itself that it is taking appropriate action in domestic abuse cases to ensure that victims are safeguarded.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Durham, Lancashire, Warwickshire and West Mercia forces were unable to provide 2017 domestic abuse arrest data. Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Durham and Gloucestershire forces were unable to provide 2016 domestic abuse arrest data.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> North Yorkshire Police was unable to provide comparable domestic abuse arrest data. Therefore, it has been removed from the graph. For further information, please see annex A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The Home Office has provided HMICFRS with data on domestic abuse-related offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017. These data are more recent than those published by the Office for National Statistics.

Greater Manchester Police is effective at referring victims and vulnerable people to other organisations. The force has partnership hubs within each of its districts and although the hubs include a variety of partner organisations and different processes, we found they were effective in assessing risk and supporting longer-term safeguarding of victims and vulnerable people. The force has appropriate arrangements for sharing information and providing safeguarding support for high-risk domestic violence victims through its multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC)<sup>15</sup> provision, which meets regularly to review cases and provide support and safeguarding for victims. Further safeguarding and support to vulnerable people and victims is provided by force neighbourhood teams. During the inspection, we found that police community support officers (PCSOs) and neighbourhood officers provide reassurance visits, work with partner agencies such as mental health to support those suffering from mental health problems, and work with families with complex needs.

### Mental health

Greater Manchester Police has a good understanding of its role in supporting people with mental health conditions and how, working with partner agencies, it can better manage the demand it faces. The force and its mental health partners have provided joint training to frontline officers and staff. For the respective organisations, this training aims to improve working relationships, and raise awareness and understanding of mental health care and services as well as police powers. It has included a pilot where officers spend a day on a mental health ward. This training has improved officers' understanding of mental health services and ensured that mental health professionals have a greater understanding of police powers, which has led to a more considered approach when taking mental health concerns to the police.

The force supports its call handlers to identify and recognise mental health problems during the risk assessment process. It has bespoke question sets for mental health and through the force ICT system it can identify, or flag, those callers who are suffering from mental health problems. However, the current system limits the number of flags, which has meant that not all individuals suffering from mental health problems have flags by their name. The force is aware of this problem and the new ICT system due to be launched in spring 2018 aims to resolve this. The force has a search facility to monitor the volume of mental health demand it has and told HMICFRS during the inspection that it responds to 25,000 incidents involving mental health problems per year.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> A multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC) is a meeting where information is shared on the highest-risk domestic abuse cases between representatives of local police, health, child protection, housing practitioners, independent domestic violence advisors, probation and other specialists from the statutory and voluntary sectors.

The provision for mental health support within Greater Manchester has been increased, with more mental health beds and suites being available. This means that vulnerable people with mental health conditions receive appropriate care rather than being detained by the police in custody accommodation. In the 12 months to 30 June 2017, police custody was used on only two occasions as a place of safety for adults, and was not used for children; this is below the rate for England and Wales. During the same period, the force requested a mental health-based place of safety on 407 occasions and the request was granted on all 407 occasions. This provision gives appropriate support to those individuals suffering from mental health illness at the earliest opportunity and also reduces the demand placed on police resources in dealing with and detaining people. The force currently has a telephone triage system in place, which means officers can telephone a mental health professional at any time to seek advice and support while dealing with a vulnerable person suffering from mental health problems.

However, this is an under-used service as it is not always reliable because it is subject to the availability of professionals who are busy on mental health wards. The force has secured funding for ten mental health professionals to be based in the force control room from March 2018, to provide a mental health professional triage and assist officers in dealing with mental health incidents. This service will be provided 24 hours every day. The force has trained mental health champions within each district and has the provision of mental health support within its custody suites.

Together with the NHS and the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, the force has put in place an Integrated Healthcare in Custody and Wider Liaison and Diversion Service. It also has processes in place for both police and partner organisations to share experiences and learning in relation to vulnerable groups. Through its bi-monthly meeting, the force identified that there were high numbers of people using bridges to consider suicide, and recognised that it did not have a protocol in place to support these vulnerable people. It has now developed a protocol to support both the person in crisis and officers dealing with such incidents.

## Investigating crimes involving vulnerable people

Greater Manchester Police requires improvement in how it investigates crimes involving vulnerable people. Crimes are mainly allocated to the most appropriate specialist staff within the force public protection investigation unit (PPIU) or criminal investigation department (CID). Domestic abuse which has been risk assessed as standard or medium risk is allocated to neighbourhood officers for investigation. However, during the inspection, we found that the investigations completed by neighbourhood officers were less effective and timely than those conducted by specialist investigators. We found that protected time for neighbourhood officers to investigate crimes was regularly being used to deal with incidents, which means that there are delays in investigating offences. We also found that there was a lack of effective supervision within some of these cases. As mentioned previously in this report, the force is aware of the issues and through its monthly audits is monitoring the quality of the investigations and providing additional training and support to investigators and supervisors to address this concern.

Officers and staff are appropriately trained and have continuing professional development (CPD) to support their knowledge and experience for the roles they undertake. During the inspection, we found that the workloads for those investigating crimes involving vulnerability are acceptable and officers told us that their workload was manageable. Staff wellbeing is considered by managers and supervisors, and wellbeing and welfare needs are addressed through a variety of activities available to officers and staff. In our file review, we found that more complex crimes received a better investigation: 38 of the crimes examined involved a vulnerable victim, of which 27 cases were assessed as having all investigative opportunities taken, 17 had a clear investigation plan and 25 had been effectively supervised. We found that in 30 of the 38 cases, investigations had been effective, with good victim care in 31 cases. For domestic violence cases, the crime file review identified 25 crimes within the overall sample, of which 23 were assessed to have been an effective investigation, and with 19 of the cases having effective supervision.

The force makes effective use of some of the legal powers available to protect vulnerable victims through its use of domestic violence protection notices (DVPNs)<sup>16</sup> and orders (DVPOs) and the domestic violence disclosure scheme (Clare's law).<sup>17</sup> It is a relatively high user of DVPO legislation compared with all 43 forces in England

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Domestic violence protection notices (DVPNs) may be issued by an authorised police officer to prevent a suspected perpetrator from returning to a victim's home and/or contacting the victim. Following the issue of the DVPN, the police must apply to magistrates for a domestic violence protection order (DVPO). The DVPO will be granted for a period of up to 28 days.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Clare's Law, or the domestic violence disclosure scheme, has two functions: the 'right to ask' the police about a partner's previous history of domestic abuse or violent acts; and the 'right to know' – police can proactively disclose information in prescribed circumstances.

and Wales. The force has consistently used these powers over the last two years, and in the 12 months to 30 June 2017 it had applied for 482 DVPOs, with 482 of them granted by the courts. However, the force has seen a reduction in the number of times DVPOs have been breached (from 84 percent in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 to 21 percent in in the 12 months to 30 June 2017). The force may wish to reassure itself that orders are still being monitored by its officers and the reasons for the reduction are understood. The force has had 511 combined 'right to know' and 'right to ask' Clare's Law applications in the 12 months to 30 June 2017; it is unable to separate the two parts of the scheme for the full year for comparison against other forces. This scheme supports people in making informed relationship choices and may prevent them from facing potential domestic abuse in the future.

The recorded outcome for an investigation shows how successful a force is at identifying a suspect and taking action or the reason why action could not be taken against a suspect. In the 12 months to 30 June 2017, the number of domestic abuse charged/summonsed outcomes for every 100 domestic abuse-related offences has decreased by 41.2 percent when compared with the 12 months to 30 June 2016. Another notable outcome for domestic abuse is the number of cases which have evidential difficulties when a suspect is identified but the victim does not support police action. For Greater Manchester Police, this rate is 31.8 per 100 domestic abuse-related offences, which is lower than the England and Wales rate of 41.8 cases per 100 domestic abuse-related crimes. This means the force is ensuring that fewer victims turn the police away from pursuing suspects compared with the national picture.

## Partnership working

Greater Manchester Police works effectively with partner organisations to provide appropriate longer-term safeguarding for vulnerable people and victims of crime. The force has multi-agency co-located hubs within each of its districts. There are some variations in the processes and partner organisations working within them, but they all provide a multi-agency approach to sharing information to assess the risk to people and ensure that safeguarding action is taken to keep safe those who are most vulnerable in the community. The force has effective processes for raising and submitting officer concerns for the safety of people to the safeguarding hubs and these are assessed by all partner organisations against their own information and data. As previously mentioned, the force works effectively with mental health services, and this has resulted in those suffering from mental health conditions receiving the care they need without the requirement to be detained in custody by the police.

To support cases of high-risk domestic abuse, each district has multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC) arrangements in place (see above). In these, police and partner organisations meet and decide on safeguarding support for victims and whether any appropriate intervention programmes, such as anger management, are suitable for the perpetrator. Greater Manchester Police and partner organisations discussed 4,850 high-risk domestic abuse cases in the 12 months to 31 March 2017, which represents 44.2 cases per 10,000 female population and is higher than the England and Wales rate of 34.6 per 10,000 female population. The caseload for the MARAC arrangements has been consistent over the last two years.

The force is adequately prepared to manage the risk posed by dangerous and sexual offenders through a dedicated team which has resources assigned to each of the force districts. The force has reviewed the risk posed by its cohort of sex offenders by conducting a further ARMS<sup>18</sup> risk assessment and has now re-assessed 85 percent of the sex offender cohort. The force anticipates that all offenders will have been re-assessed by the end of 2017. The overall cohort of sex offenders has been reduced by 7 percent from 1 July 2016 to 1 July 2017 and the levels of assessed risk have been reduced for the very high-risk cohort of offenders.

The force has an ongoing innovative pilot scheme to manage offenders. This has analysed the cohort of offenders to understand the offending types and triggers for offending in order to allow more focused and appropriate support and management of offenders to prevent re-offending. The force is using polygraph<sup>19</sup> testing for offenders, which has proved successful in determining the intentions of offenders and has resulted in offenders being returned to prison. The force is proactive in the use of preventative legislation and has increased its use of sexual harm prevention orders<sup>20</sup> by 12 percent in the 12 months to 30 June 2017 compared with the same period in 2016 (366 issued compared to 328). The force manages these orders actively and has identified 36 offenders breaching them.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> ARMS (active risk management system for sex offenders) allows officers to prioritise the work that needs to be done to manage the offender effectively in the community, taking into account what is happening in the offender's life.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Popularly referred to as a lie detector, a polygraph measures and records several physiological indices such as blood pressure, pulse, respiration and skin conductivity while the subject is asked and answers a series of questions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Sexual harm prevention orders (SHPOs) can be applied to anyone convicted or cautioned for a sexual or violent offence. They can place a range of restrictions on individuals depending on the nature of the case, such as limiting their internet use, preventing them from being alone with a child under 16, or preventing travel abroad.

#### Cause of concern

Greater Manchester Police is failing to respond appropriately to some people who are vulnerable and at risk. This means that early opportunities to safeguard victims and secure evidence at the scene are being missed, and victims are being put at risk.

#### Recommendations

- The force should improve its understanding of demand for its services and take appropriate action to ensure demand is managed more effectively.
- The force should improve its ability to respond appropriately to calls for service and improve the initial investigative response it provides to all vulnerable victims.

### **Area for improvement**

 The force should implement a process to obtain feedback from victims of domestic abuse.

## **Specialist capabilities**

### **Ungraded**

## National policing responsibilities

The Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR)<sup>21</sup> specifies six national threats: terrorism, cyber-crime, public order, civil emergencies, child sexual abuse and serious and organised crime.

Greater Manchester Police has the necessary arrangements in place to ensure that it can fulfil its national policing responsibilities. The force has assessed its capability to respond to the six national threats included in the SPR. The force uses the nationally recognised MoRiLE (management of risk in law enforcement) methodology to prioritise the national threats and develop work programmes to build capacity. We found this to be an effective means of identifying risks, involving external organisations, engaging the workforce and developing the skills and experience the force requires. The force has assigned chief officers to each of the threats and they have established effective programmes to improve the force's performance in this area. These arrangements also ensure that there is strong governance and constant scrutiny to assess the force's state of preparedness.

The force also reports annually to the Mayor of Greater Manchester, setting out its progress in response to the national threats.<sup>22</sup>

The force has established a joint communication centre to bring together senior representatives from the ambulance service, the fire and rescue service, the police and other organisations in the event of a major incident. It is known as the strategic co-ordination centre (SCC) and it facilitates an integrated response in times of crisis. The force has tested the SCC in training exercises to assess the ability of Greater Manchester Police and other forces in the region to mobilise large numbers of officers should there be large-scale civil disorder in the North West.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> The SPR is issued annually by the Home Secretary. It sets out the latest national threats and appropriate national policing capabilities required to counter them. National threats require a co-ordinated or aggregated response from police forces, national agencies or other partners. *The Strategic Policing Requirement*, Home Office, March 2015. Available at: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\_data/file/417116/The\_Strategic\_Policing\_Requirement.pdf">www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\_data/file/417116/The\_Strategic\_Policing\_Requirement.pdf</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> The Mayor of Greater Manchester oversees public services throughout the area, including policing.

The force's arrangements to manage major incidents were thoroughly tested during the terrorist attack at the Manchester Arena in May 2017 and were found to be effective. Greater Manchester Police carefully de-briefs after training exercises and major incidents to identify learning points and ensure its operation is subject to continuous improvement.

### Firearms capability

HMICFRS inspected how well forces were prepared to manage firearms attacks in our 2016 effectiveness inspections. Subsequent terrorist attacks in the UK and Europe have meant that the police service maintains a firm focus on armed capability in England and Wales.

It is not just terrorist attacks that place operational demands on armed officers. The threat can include the activity of organised crime groups or armed street gangs and all other crime involving guns. The *Code of Practice on Police use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons*<sup>23</sup> makes forces responsible for implementing national standards of armed policing. The code stipulates that a chief officer be designated to oversee these standards. This requires the chief officer to set out the firearms threat in an armed policing strategic threat and risk assessment (APSTRA). The chief officer must also set out clear rationales for the number of armed officers (armed capacity) and the level to which they are trained (armed capability).

Some forces in England and Wales operate joint arrangements with other forces to provide armed policing. Greater Manchester Police is a force that provides its own armed capabilities; however, it shares training facilities with other forces in the North West of England. The force has an adequate understanding of the potential harm facing the public. It shares an APSTRA with other forces in the region, to determine the forces' training needs. This APSTRA conforms to the requirements of the code and College of Policing guidance;<sup>24</sup> it was published in April 2017.

However, the purpose of an APSTRA goes beyond the identification of a force's training requirements. HMICFRS would expect to see an assessment of the threats and risks in each force area, with resources in place to address them. For this reason, it would be advisable for Greater Manchester Police to develop an APSTRA that is bespoke to the Greater Manchester area; this would give greater assurance that the deployment of armed officers meets local requirements. A chief officer represents all forces in the region in scrutinising the required levels of armed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Code of Practice on Police use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons, Home Office, 2003.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice on armed policing. Available at: www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/?s

capability and capacity. We were encouraged to see that he has extended his responsibilities to develop APSTRAs for each of the forces in the region. We will monitor these developments in future inspection activity in the region.

The force receives additional Home Office funding as part of a national programme to boost armed capacity in England and Wales. We established that the force has fulfilled its commitment to the programme by increasing the availability of armed response vehicles (ARVs) by the target date set for April 2017. This was achieved by accelerating the recruitment of ARV officers as well as adjusting shift patterns and paying overtime to increase the number of armed officers. The recruitment programme continues and is scheduled to be completed in forthcoming months.

### Annex A - About the data

The information presented in this report comes from a range of sources, including data published by the Home Office, the Office for National Statistics, inspection fieldwork and data collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales.

Where HMICFRS collected data directly from police forces, we took reasonable steps to agree the design of the data collection with forces and with other interested parties such as the Home Office. We gave forces several opportunities to quality assure and validate the data they provided us, to ensure the accuracy of the evidence presented. For instance:

- Data that forces submitted were checked and queried with those forces where data were notably different from other forces or were internally inconsistent.
- All forces were asked to check the final data used in the report and correct any errors identified.

The source of the data is presented with each figure in the report, and is set out in more detail within this annex. The source of Force in numbers data is also set out below.

## Methodology

#### Data in the report

British Transport Police was outside the scope of inspection. Any aggregated totals for England and Wales exclude British Transport Police data, so will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Where other forces have been unable to supply data, this is mentioned under the relevant sections below.

### **Population**

For all uses of population as a denominator in our calculations, unless otherwise noted, we use Office for National Statistics (ONS) mid-2016 population estimates. These were the most recent data available at the time of the inspection.

For the specific case of City of London Police, we include both resident and transient population within our calculations. This is to account for the unique nature and demographics of this force's responsibility.

### Survey of police staff

HMICFRS surveyed the police workforce across forces in England and Wales, to understand their views on workloads, redeployment and the suitability of assigned tasks. This survey was a non-statistical, voluntary sample which means that results may not be representative of the workforce population. The number of responses varied between 16 and 1,678 across forces. Therefore, we treated results with caution and used them for identifying themes that could be explored further during fieldwork rather than to assess individual force performance.

### Ipsos MORI survey of public attitudes towards policing

HMICFRS commissioned Ipsos MORI to survey attitudes towards policing between 21 July and 15 August 2017. Respondents were drawn from an online panel and results were weighted by age, gender and work status to match the population profile of the force area. The sampling method used is not a statistical random sample and the sample size was small, varying between 300 and 321 individuals in each force area. Therefore, any results provided are only an indication of satisfaction rather than an absolute.

The findings of this survey are available on our website:

www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/data/peel-assessments

#### Review of crime files

HMICFRS reviewed 2,700<sup>25</sup> police case files across crime types for:

- theft from person;
- rape (including attempts);
- stalking;
- harassment;
- common assault;
- grievous bodily harm (wounding);
- actual bodily harm.

Our file review was designed to provide a broad overview of the identification of vulnerability, the effectiveness of investigations and to understand how victims are treated through police processes. We randomly selected files from crimes recorded between 1 January 2017 and 31 March 2017 and assessed them against several

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> 60 case files were reviewed in each force, with the exception of the Metropolitan Police Service, West Midlands Police and West Yorkshire Police where 90 case files were reviewed.

criteria. Due to the small sample size of cases selected per force, we did not use results from the file review as the sole basis for assessing individual force performance, but alongside other evidence gathered.

### Force in numbers

A dash in this graphic indicates that a force was not able to supply HMICFRS with data or the data supplied by the forces were not comparable.

### Calls for assistance (including those for domestic abuse)

These data were collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales. In 2017, the data requested from forces contained a different breakdown of occurrences where the police were called to an incident.

#### Recorded crime and crime outcomes

These data are obtained from Home Office police recorded crime and outcomes data tables for the 12 months to 30 June 2017 and are taken from the October 2017 Home Office data release, which is available from:

### www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-recorded-crime-open-data-tables

Total police-recorded crime includes all crime, except fraud offences, recorded by all police forces in England and Wales. Home Office publications on the overall volumes and rates of recorded crime and outcomes include British Transport Police, which is outside the scope of this HMICFRS inspection. Therefore, England and Wales rates in this report will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Data referring to police-recorded crime should be treated with care, as recent increases may be attributed to the renewed focus on the quality and compliance of crime recording since HMICFRS' national inspection of crime data in 2014.

Suffolk Constabulary was unable to submit 2017 outcomes data to the Home Office due to data quality issues, relating to the changing of its crime recording system to Athena. Therefore Suffolk Constabulary has been excluded from the England and Wales figure.

Other notable points to consider when interpreting outcomes data are listed below.

 Crime outcome proportions show the percentage of crimes recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017 that have been assigned each outcome. This means that each crime is tracked or linked to its outcome. Therefore these data are subject to change, as more crimes are assigned outcomes over time.

- Under the new framework, 37 police forces in England and Wales provide outcomes data through the Home Office data hub (HODH) on a monthly basis. All other forces provide these data via a manual return also occurring on a monthly basis.
- Leicestershire, Staffordshire and West Yorkshire forces participated in the Ministry of Justice's out of court disposals pilot. This means they no longer issued simple cautions or cannabis/khat warnings and they restrict their use of penalty notices for disorder as disposal options for adult offenders, as part of the pilot. These three pilot forces continued to operate in accordance with the pilot conditions since the pilot ended in November 2015. Other forces subsequently also limited their use of some out of court disposals. Therefore, the outcomes data should be viewed with this in mind.
- Direct comparisons should not be made between general crime outcomes and domestic abuse-related outcomes. Domestic abuse-related outcomes are based on the number of outcomes for domestic-abuse related offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017, irrespective of when the crime was recorded. Therefore, the domestic abuse-related crimes and outcomes recorded in the reporting year are not tracked, whereas the general outcomes are tracked.
- For a full commentary and explanation of outcome types please see Crime
  Outcomes in England and Wales: year ending March 2017, Home Office, July
  2017. Available from:
   <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\_data/file/633048/crime-outcomes-hosb0917.pdf">www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\_data/file/633048/crime-outcomes-hosb0917.pdf</a>

#### **Anti-social behaviour**

These data are obtained from Office for National Statistics data tables (year ending 31 March 2017), available from:

www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/policeforc eareadatatables

All police forces record incidents of anti-social behaviour (ASB) reported to them in accordance with the provisions of the National Standard for Incident Recording (NSIR). Forces record incidents under NSIR in accordance with the same victim-focused approach that applies for recorded crime, although these data are not subject to the same quality assurance as the main recorded crime collection. Incident counts should be interpreted as incidents recorded by the police, rather than reflecting the true level of victimisation. Other agencies also deal with ASB incidents (for example, local authorities and social landlords), but incidents reported to these agencies will not generally be included in police data.

When viewing this data the reader should be aware that Warwickshire Police had a problem with its incident recording. For a small percentage of all incidents reported during 2015-16 the force could not identify whether these were ASB or other types of incident. These incidents have been distributed pro rata for Warwickshire, so that two percent of ASB incidents in the reporting year for 2015-16 is estimated.

#### **Domestic abuse**

Data relating to domestic abuse-flagged offences is obtained through the Home Office for the 12 months to 30 June 2017. These are more recent data than those previously published by Office for National Statistics. The Home Office collects these data regularly and requires all forces to record accurately and flag domestic abuse crimes. Domestic abuse flags should be applied in accordance with the Home Office Counting Rules<sup>26</sup> to ensure consistency across forces, and within published data sets.

Data relating to domestic abuse arrests and outcomes were collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales.

Further information about the domestic abuse statistics and recent releases is available from:

#### www.ons.gov.uk/releases/domesticabuseinenglandandwalesyearendingmarch2017

When viewing this data the reader should be aware that North Yorkshire Police was unable to give the Home Office comparable data on domestic abuse-flagged crimes. The force extracted data for HMICFRS on the powers and outcomes used to deal with these offences by using an enhanced search. This search examined additional factors (such as the victim / suspect relationship) and included a keyword search to identify additional domestic abuse crimes which may not have been flagged. The force used a simpler search, which identified domestic abuse crimes by flagging alone, to extract data it supplied to the Home Office. As North Yorkshire Police's data on domestic abuse are not comparable with other forces, we have excluded the data.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Home Office Counting Rules are rules in accordance with which crime data – required to be submitted to the Home Secretary under sections 44 and 45 of the Police Act 1996 – must be collected. They set down how the police service in England and Wales must record crime, how crimes must be classified according to crime type and categories, whether and when to record crime, how many crimes to record in respect of a single incident and the regime for the re-classification of crimes as no-crimes.

### Organised crime groups (OCGs)

These data were collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales. City of London Police is excluded from the England and Wales rate as its OCG data are not comparable with other forces due to size and its wider national remit.

As at 1 July 2017 City of London Police had recorded 46 OCGs. However during the inspection we found that only six OCGs were within the force's geographical area and the remaining 40 were part of the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau's remit.

## Figures in the report

Not all forces' reports will contain all the figures we mention in the sections below. This is because some forces' data was incomplete or not comparable with England and Wales data, and in 2017 HMICFRS undertook risk-based inspections. More details about our risk-based approach can be found here:

www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/peel-assessments/how-we-inspect/2017-

<u>www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/nmicfrs/peei-assessments/now-we-inspect/2017-peel-assessment/#risk-based</u>

# Rate of anti-social behaviour (ASB) powers per 1 million population, by force, in the 12 months to 30 June 2017

These data were collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales. HMICFRS collected data on anti-social behaviour powers, including:

- criminal behaviour orders;
- community protection notices;
- civil injunctions;
- dispersal orders.

Together these powers form the anti-social behaviour (ASB) powers considered in this report.

The Crime and Policing Act 2014 introduced ASB powers which can be applied by both local authorities and the police. The ASB powers data provided in this report covers police data. Therefore, results should be treated with caution as they may not include instances where local authorities exercised these powers.

When viewing this data the reader should be aware of the following:

 Bedfordshire Police, Greater Manchester Police and the Metropolitan Police Service were unable to provide data on anti-social behaviour powers as the data are not held centrally within each force.

- Greater Manchester Police was unable to provide any 2016 ASB use of powers data. Greater Manchester Police intends for its new integrated operational policing system to incorporate recording of ASB powers.
- Suffolk Constabulary was only able to provide data for the southern area of the force in 2017. Therefore its data are excluded.
- The forces highlighted above are not included in the figure or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.
- Gloucestershire, Hertfordshire, Humberside and Merseyside forces were only able to provide partial 2017 ASB use of powers data.
- Gloucestershire Constabulary and Hertfordshire Constabulary were unable to obtain data regarding the number of civil injunctions as their local authorities lead the application of these.
- Humberside Police was unable to provide data on community protection notices and civil injunction notices as its local authorities lead the application of these. The force does not collect data on criminal behaviour orders and dispersal orders.
- Merseyside Police was unable to provide data on dispersal orders as these orders are attached to individual crime files.

# Proportion of investigations where action was taken, by force, for offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

Suffolk Constabulary was unable to provide 2017 crime outcomes data. Dorset Police was unable to provide 2016 crime outcomes data. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the figure.

Dorset Police was unable to provide 2016 crimes outcome data, because it had difficulty with the recording of crime outcomes for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. This was due to the force introducing the Niche records management system in spring 2015. Problems with the implementation of Niche meant that crime outcomes were not reliably recorded.

# Domestic abuse arrest rate (per 100 domestic abuse-related offences), by force, in the 12 months to 30 June 2017

Please see 'Domestic abuse' above.

 The arrest rate is calculated using a common time period for arrests and offences. It is important to note that each arrest is not necessarily directly linked to its specific domestic abuse offence recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017 in this calculation. It is also possible to have more than one arrest per offence. In addition, the reader should note the increase in police-recorded crime which affected the majority of forces over the last year. This may mean arrest rates are higher than the figures suggest. Despite this, the calculation still indicates whether the force prioritises arrests for domestic abuse offenders over other potential forms of action. HMICFRS evaluated the arrest rate alongside other measures (such as use of voluntary attendance or body-worn video cameras) during our inspection process to understand how each force deals with domestic abuse overall.

When viewing this data the reader should be aware of the following:

- Durham, Lancashire, Warwickshire and West Mercia forces were unable to provide domestic abuse arrest data. North Yorkshire Police was unable to provide comparable domestic abuse crime and arrest data, so a rate could not be calculated. Therefore, these forces are not included in the figure.
- Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Durham and Gloucestershire forces were unable to provide 2016 domestic abuse arrest data. Therefore, these forces do not have 2016 data included in the figure.

When viewing domestic abuse arrest data for 2016, the reader should be aware of the following:

- Cambridgeshire Constabulary was unable to provide 2016 domestic abuse arrest data due to a recording problem that meant it could only obtain accurate data from a manual audit of its custody records.
- Lancashire Constabulary had difficulty in identifying all domestic abuseflagged arrests. This affected 23 days in the 12 months to 30 June 2016. The force investigated this and confirmed that the impact on the 2016 data provided to HMICFRS would be marginal and that these are the most reliable data it can provide.

# Rate of organised crime groups (OCGs) per 1 million population, by force, as at 1 July 2017

Please see 'Organised crime groups' above.

Organised crime group data from City of London Police are not comparable with other forces. Therefore, its data are not included in the figure.

For data relating to 2016 the number of OCGs in Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police force areas is a combined total of OCGs for the two force areas. The OCGs per 1 million population rate is based upon their areas' combined population. For the 2017 data Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police force split their OCGs into two separate force areas.